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Notes & Comments
A Decade Later: United States v.
Virginia and the Rise and Fall of
"Skeptical Scrutiny"
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Breyer: And even a woman who says, I understand
that, but for me, she says, for me, I think it would work
better at VMI, and it may be true as to her, irrespective of
the majority, mightn't it?
Mr. Olson: A choice would have to be made, since the
system would fundamentally have to be altered in the
presence of coeducation. It will not work. It may work
well with just women. It may work well with just men,
and there's no stereotypes associated with that.
Justice Souter: No, but you say . . . there's no stereotype,
but isn't it the case, as Justice Breyer said, that if you are
going to justify your system by its distinctness, then you
always have a built-in justification, because you can say,
if you change it, it's no longer distinct, the value is gone,
and that's why, it seems to me, under middle tier scrutiny,
you've got to say the distinctness is worth it for some other
reason.
Mr. Olson: The distinction - the distinctiveness is worth it
because young people educate differently and we must, in
this society, find ways to educate them successfully, and
we must develop systems, not a student body for each
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student, but systems that will attract people, and
according to the experts, not the lawyers, work well for
young people. Now, that is worth it ....
Justice Ginsburg: The question is, wouldn't something else
work almost as well without denying opportunity to
anyone?1
Thus was the scene before the United States Supreme Court a
decade ago. The controversy at issue was United States v.
Virginia,2 a culmination of six years of intensely passionate
litigation that sparked a maelstrom of media and scholarly
attention. 3 The case was heralded as the beginning of a new era
in gender-based equal protection jurisprudence. 4 And, for a time,
it was.
The case involved the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a
small all-male, state-supported military institution in a small
town in Virginia. It was a school that had, for over a century and
a half, successfully produced an impressive record of alumni who
had served both state and nation in distinguished civilian and
military capacities. Unlike most colleges, VMI seeks to inculcate
its pupils with character, that of a "citizen-soldier," in addition to
education. Its method is unique. To achieve its end the school
provides an atmosphere of total egalitarianism, strict discipline,
total lack of privacy, and constant physical and mental stress. To
VMI, homogeneity of gender was necessary for this chemistry to
attain its proper objective.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53-54, United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
2. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
3. The interested reader will find a comprehensive, and pleasantly
readable, account of VMI and United States v. Virginia in PHILIPPA STRUM,
WOMEN IN THE BARRACKS: THE VMI CASE AND EQUAL RIGHTS (2002). The effect
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision at VMI, and the changes made
thereafter, is entertainingly retold in LAURA FAIRCHILD BRODIE, BREAKING
OUT: VMI AND THE COMING OF WOMEN (2000). Deborah A. Widiss's note, Re-
Viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States
v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237 (1998), is an unrivaled analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court opinion and the use of history therein.
4. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U.
J. GENDER & L. 35, 35 (1997); Christina Gleason, Comment, United States v.
Virginia: Skeptical Scrutiny and the Future of Gender Discrimination Law, 70
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 801, 809 (1996).
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In 1990, the Department of Justice challenged the all-male
character of VMI as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As has become well known over the last
decade, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that VMI, although
an honorable place, could not exist in its traditional form under an
evolved Equal Protection Clause. The Court applied - to borrow a
phrase provided by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her last, and
unanimously supported, U.S. Supreme Court opinion - a "blunt
remedy. ' 5 The phrase connotes the power of the High Court to
terminate, or to drastically reform, that which the Court
determines to be in conflict with an ever-developing constitutional
law. VMI did not fit the Court's reading of the Equal Protection
Clause and it would be made to do so. 'NMI's story continued,"
the Court concluded, "as our comprehension of 'We the People'
expanded."6
For lawyers and legal scholars alike, what was most profound
about United States v. Virginia was the manner in which this
"blunt remedy" was applied. Explicitly, the Virginia Court
applied a standard, developed twenty years before United States v.
Virginia, known as intermediate scrutiny. As the middle point of
the U.S. Supreme Court's tripartite structure of equal protection
analysis, intermediate scrutiny calls for a less convincing
governmental justification for state action than for that which
classifies persons according to race or national origin, but it is a
more demanding test than that applied to classifications which do
not distinguish persons according to such immutable
characteristics. However, through United States v. Virginia, the
Court would increase the rigor of intermediate scrutiny and give it
a new name: "skeptical scrutiny. '7 As applied to the facts of
United States v. Virginia, "skeptical scrutiny" would prove much
more closely related to strict scrutiny - the standard used to
review classifications based on race or national origin - than it
would to the traditional intermediate scrutiny test. This, of
course, the U.S. Supreme Court can do. After all, the three tiers
of equal protection review were, in the words of Justice Scalia,
5. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961,
969 (2006).
6. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557.
7. Id. at 531.
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"made-up" by the Court.8
But this emboldened standard of intermediate scrutiny would
live, at the U.S. Supreme Court level, only a short time. Five
years after its creation, two Justices who had supported "skeptical
scrutiny" in United States v. Virginia would defect, forming a
majority with three other Justices, two of whom opposed
"skeptical scrutiny" in Virginia and one who recused himself from
that case. Subsequently, the Court would deliver another opinion
again restating intermediate scrutiny in its traditional form.
Standing in the present, and looking back at the thirty-five
year development of U.S. Supreme Court gender-based equal
protection jurisprudence, United States v. Virginia appears as an
anomaly. In fact, it is. Neither before nor after United States v.
Virginia had the U.S. Supreme Court required a gender
classification to meet the rigors of "skeptical scrutiny."
Accordingly, this Comment will present the case that after United
States v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court no longer requires the
continued application of "skeptical scrutiny."
Many lower federal courts, however, continue to apply the test
as it was put forth in United States v. Virginia. To be sure, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that lower courts should apply U.S.
Supreme Court precedent if it directly resembles a case before the
lower courts - even if some of the reasoning of that precedent
appears rejected by later precedent - so that the U.S. Supreme
Court alone may maintain the "prerogative of overruling its
decisions."9 But for most gender-based claims, the lower courts
should also be aware that because of the decisions of a majority of
the U.S. Supreme Court concerning gender classifications after
United States v. Virginia, it seems clear that "skeptical scrutiny,"
like the all-male VMI, is now a piece of history.
This Comment is not intended to advocate what should or
should not be. It is instead meant to view the evolution of U.S.
Supreme Court gender-based equal protection jurisprudence as it
stands today and to serve as a sober instruction to the lower
federal courts. To meet this end, Part II of this Comment will
describe the evolution of intermediate scrutiny in its traditional
8. Id. at 570 (dissenting opinion).
9. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989).
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form. Part III will look closely at the VMI litigation and the issues
involved, as this led to the creation of "skeptical scrutiny." Part
IV will explain "skeptical scrutiny" in the context of United States
v. Virginia, its one and only appearance on the High Court. Part
V will describe the Court's shift to the traditional intermediate
scrutiny at the expense of "skeptical scrutiny," and take into
account the two new members of the Court, leading to the
conclusion that, for the U.S. Supreme Court, "skeptical scrutiny"
no longer exists.
II. TOWARDS A "MORE SEARCHING JUDICIAL INQUIRY"
Nature had injured [the Queen] in not making her a man,
for, but for her sex, she would have surpassed all the
heroes of history.
Thomas Cromwell, circa 153310
Generalizations about the way women and men are, I have
several times said, seem to me unhelpful in making
decisions about particular individuals.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 199611
The above words of Justice Ginsburg were published in the
Georgetown Law Journal one month before the U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately decided United States v. Virginia. Her words are
a distinct break from Thomas Cromwell's past; and they signify a
refusal to accept the notion that one's sex predetermines the level
to which one can aspire. As a litigator and later as a jurist,
Justice Ginsburg succeeded in significantly influencing the
evolution of gender equality jurisprudence by her determination to
prevent antiquated notions of gender roles preclude individual
women from attaining their full potential. As a litigator, the
efforts of Ginsburg and her colleagues would result in two
important landmarks: (1) judicial abandonment of the use of
traditional norms based on the presumed societal roles of men and
women as an acceptable governmental objective for gender
discriminatory legislation; and (2) a heightened standard of
judicial review for gender discrimination claims brought under the
10. MARY M. LUKE, CATHERINE, THE QUEEN 442 (1967).
11. Foreword, 84 GEO. L.J. 1651, 1654 (1996).
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
Before either landmark was achieved, the U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause
under one of two levels of scrutiny. Claims brought due to
legislation or government action which involved a "suspect
classification," such as race or national origin, require courts to
apply "the most rigid scrutiny."'13 A court presumes such action
unconstitutional unless the government can justify the
classification with a "compelling governmental interes[t]" and only
if the classification is "narrowly tailored" to further that interest. 14
In contrast, when a "suspect classification" is not involved, equal
protection claims are subject to the deferential "rational basis"
review, whereby the classification is presumptively constitutional
unless it "bear[s] no rational relationship to the State's [or
Congress's] objectives." 15
Courts traditionally analyzed gender classifications under
rational basis review, causing the results of gender discrimination
claims before the U.S. Supreme Court that relied upon the Equal
Protection Clause to be initially disappointing. 16  A classic
example occurred in 1873, where the Court refused to overrule an
Illinois statute that denied women a license to practice law. 17
Justice Bradley, concurring in the judgment, held that "[t]he
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life."18
The efforts of feminist activists, became the driving force
behind the social and legal change towards gender equality. They
cannot be reduced to a single, unified theory. Some are more
radical than others and many seek to bring about change through
different methodologies. Because the efforts of Ruth Bader
12. Of course, equal protection claims brought against the federal
government are subject to the judicially created "equal protection component"
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
15. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a state's
exclusion of women on juries); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)
(upholding a statute preventing women from holding bartending jobs).
17. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
18. Id. at 141.
2006]
188 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:182
Ginsburg, first as an ACLU litigator and later as the U.S.
Supreme Court Justice who authored United States v. Virginia,
were so instrumental in the Court's gender-related jurisprudence,
her understanding of feminism shall be our focus.
Commentators have classified Ginsburg as an "egalitarian
feminist."' 9 The classification connotes the understanding that
women and men are equals and that legislation designed to
"protect" women inherently places them in an inferior position. 20
Whatever the classification, Ginsburg's own definition of
"feminism" is the most telling: "It means freeing people, men as
well as women, to be you and me, allowing people to pursue the
talents and qualities they have without artificial restraints. '21
The "artificial restraints" Ginsburg spoke of sprang from age-old
stereotypes about the place of women in society. She referred to
this concept as the 'separate sphere' mentality" whereby men and
women are accorded separate societal functions; and women,
considered the weaker sex, are provided with "protective"
legislation. 22 Such "protective" legislation enabled lawmakers to
restrict women from a variety of professions, such as law23 and
even tending bar,24 to "protect" them from "'the greed as well as
the passion of man. '2 5
Additionally, such "protective" legislation, based entirely upon
stereotype, restricted the opportunities of individuals who may
personify an exception to those stereotypes. The heart of
Ginsburg's feminism concerns itself with such individuals, and
would be a major influence in her drafting of "skeptical scrutiny"
in United States v. Virginia. She believed that the development of
one's "full, human capacit[y]" and the ability to "achieve according
19. See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV.
861, 867-68 (1997); Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J., 118-20 (2001).
20. Olney, supra note 19, at 118.
21. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Excerpt from Remarks Given at the
International Women's Forum Lunch, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 25, 26
(2000).
22. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United
States as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under
the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 266, 269 (1997).
23. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 130 (1873).
24. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
25. See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 270 (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, 422 (1908)).
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to [one's] individual talent" is stymied by legislation that
predetermines one's role according to gender. 26 A heightened
standard of judicial scrutiny, used to review gender-based
legislation, was, in the absence of an Equal Rights Amendment,
the only way to ensure that individual women, and the nation that
their talents would serve, could be developed to full capacity. 27
As a litigator with the ACLU, Ginsburg was unfazed by the
lack of any favorable precedent concerning gender classifications.
She would later speak of the Founders' inability, due to
contemporary cultural norms, to respect fully the ideals of
equality proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence. 28 She
believed, however, that those very ideals possessed "growth
potential. '29 Yet, Ginsburg did not favor a bold, sudden strategy
to encourage the U.S. Supreme Court to create a higher standard
of judicial scrutiny for gender discrimination claims. Instead she
prudently took on cases she deemed 'clear winners,"' with the aim
of easing the Court, case-by-case, towards a heightened standard
of scrutiny.30 By doing so, Ginsburg believed, she would establish
a foundation of gender equality law and from there prod the Court
towards raising the standard of review well beyond rational
basis. 3 1  One of her former colleagues described her strategy:
'Present the Court with the next logical step . . . and then the
next and then the next. Don't ask them to go too far too fast, or
you'll lose what you might have won.' 3 2
The first case that Ginsburg and her ACLU colleagues
advocated later became the landmark decision of Reed v. Reed.33
26. Id. at 270-71.
27. By constitutional mandate, the Equal Rights Amendment would have
effectively required a strict scrutiny analysis for gender classifications. See
Joan A. Lukey & Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need a Federal Equal
Rights Amendment?, 44 BOSTON B.J. 10, 10 (2000). Advocates of the proposed
amendment would prove unable to convince the requisite three-quarters of
the state legislatures to adopt the amendment by the time the ratification
deadline arrived in 1982. Id. They fell short by three states. Id.
28. Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 265.
29. Id.
30. Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to
Change the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335, 337 (1992).
31. Id. at 337-38.
32. Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1997, (Magazine), at 64.
33. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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The case involved an Idaho intestacy statute that granted
preference to males over females as estate administrators in the
event that they were otherwise "equally entitled to administer. ''34
Sally Reed challenged the statute because it named her estranged
husband, Cecil, administrator of their deceased son's estate on the
simple basis that Cecil was male. 35
In her brief on behalf of Sally Reed, Ginsburg began by
arguing that gender discrimination was analogous to racial
discrimination, and therefore, gender-based classifications should
also be subject to strict scrutiny. 36 She likened the history of
gender discrimination in this country to that of racial minorities. 37
Her attempt was to demonstrate to the Court the injustices of the
past, and ask them to prevent further injustice in the case at hand
and in the future.
Secondly, Ginsburg presented to the Court that traditional
stereotypes, such as women as "keeper of the hearth," had become
outdated.38 She cited scientific advancements that now allow
women to control reproduction; as well as the increased lifespan of
women, which meant more of life was spent without caring for
young children. 39 She also pointed to women's increased presence
in the workplace and in institutions of higher learning. 40
In a unanimous decision, the Reed Court refused to establish
a standard of strict scrutiny for gender-based claims, but did hold
that the Idahoan statute was unconstitutional. 4 1  The Court,
however, also declined to apply a traditional rational basis review.
34. Id. at 73.
35. Id. at 72.
36. Brief of Petitioner at 15, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
In her own words:
[A]lithough the legislature may distinguish between individuals on
the basis of their ability or need, it is presumptively impermissible to
distinguish on the basis of congenital and unalterable biological
traits of birth over which the individual has no control and for which
he or she should not be penalized. Such conditions include not only
race, a matter clearly within the "suspect classification" doctrine, but
include as well the sex of the individual.
Id.
37. Id. at 17-18.
38. Id. at 51.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 62-63.
41. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 at 76-77.
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The Court recognized that the state's avowed rationale, that the
statute was designed to limit the caseload of the probate courts,
was not entirely irrational.4 2 However, the Court was unable to
view the state's rationale as compliant with the Equal Protection
Clause's demand that the classifications have 'a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' '4 3 Indeed,
the Court held, the statute's preference for one sex over the other,
without any regard to their individual qualifications, "merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is . . . the
very kind of legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. . . ."44 Reed, therefore became the first case where the
U.S. Supreme Court held a gender-based classification
unconstitutional. 45 Ruth Bader Ginsburg had laid her foundation.
The success of Reed led Ginsburg to base all of her subsequent
arguments on the Reed brief.4 6 The next landmark decision,
Frontiero v. Richardson, was decided only a year and a half after
Reed; and there, a plurality of four Justices wholeheartedly
adopted Ginsburg's argument that gender classifications, like
race, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.4 7 The case arose as
a challenge to a federal statute which provided that male
members of the military could immediately receive fringe benefits
for their dependents, but female members needed to prove that
they were in fact providing their husbands with more than one-
half of their support.48  Because 'administrative convenience"'
was the government's rationale, the statute was already doomed
under the Reed standard; however, the plurality went further.49
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, adopted Ginsburg's
assertion that gender-based discrimination was analogous to that
42. Id. at 76.
43. Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
44. Id.
45. Olney, supra note 19, at 110.
46. Toni J. Ellington, Sylvia K. Higashi, Jayna K. Kim & Mark M.
Murakami, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U.
HAW. L. REV. 699, 727 (1998).
47. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). The plurality would go so far as to include
portions of Ginsburg's brief in the final opinion. See STRUM, supra note 3, at
66.
48. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677.
49. Id. at 688.
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of race. In a now famous sentence, he wrote: "There can be no
doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination.' '50 Sex, the plurality held, was an "immutable
characteristic" an "accident of birth," and classifications based
upon sex often destined an individual for an "inferior legal status
without regard to [one's] actual capabilities. ''51
Therefore, if the plurality had their way, strict scrutiny would
be applied to sex-based classifications; but a plurality is not a
majority. The concurring Justices agreed that the statute should
be stricken under the Reed standard, but restrained themselves
from adopting strict scrutiny, largely because the people
themselves were deciding the issue: the Equal Rights Amendment
was contemporaneously touring the country asking acceptance
from at least three-quarters of the state legislatures. 52
Ginsburg later participated as an amicus in Craig v. Boren,53
which established, almost as a compromise, an intermediate form
of scrutiny as the standard of review for gender discrimination
claims. There, an Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of "3.2%
beer" to males before twenty-one years and females before
eighteen.54 The Court began its analysis with what is now the
classic statement of intermediate scrutiny: "[C]lassifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives."55
In other words, the state's objective must be something more
compelling than that which would survive a rational basis review,
and the means must be carefully designed to achieve that
objective.
In Craig, the state's proffered justification was traffic safety,
and, to demonstrate a "substantial1]" relationship between the
classification and that goal, the state provided statistical evidence
that young men were more often arrested for drunk driving than
young women. 56 The Court did find traffic safety to be an
50. Id. at 684.
51. Id. at 686-87.
52. Id. at 692. In addition to the concurring Justices, there was a lonely
dissenter: Justice William H. Rehnquist. Id. at 691.
53. 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976).
54. Id. at 191-92.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id. at 199. The statistics demonstrated that 0.18% of females and 2%
of males aged 18-20 were arrested for drunk driving. Id. at 200-01.
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"important governmental objective" but the "broad sociological
propositions" that the statistics sought to demonstrate did not
"substantially relat[e]" to the prevention of drunk driving. 57 Thus,
under intermediate scrutiny, the classification was "too tenuous"
to justify a gender-based classification.5 8
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court never adopted strict
scrutiny for gender-based classifications during Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's career as a litigator. Justice Brennan, in Frontiero,
was the last U.S. Supreme Court Justice to attempt a coalition in
favor of such a standard. Even Ginsburg, as herself a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice, would not attempt that bold feat in
United States v. Virginia. But Ginsburg's strategy had worked.
She and her colleagues had successfully convinced the Court to
include sex-based classifications under a higher standard of
scrutiny. For her efforts, her appointer, President Bill Clinton,
would describe her as "the Thurgood Marshall of the women's
movement. '59 The Craig standard of intermediate scrutiny was
not Ginsburg's ultimate goal. But Ginsburg has never believed
that justice comes quickly. At her Senate confirmation hearing
she invoked the wisdom of Justice Benjamin Cardozo: 'Justice is
not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advance. ' 60
III. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. "A Singular Place"
It is education that must give souls the national form, and
so direct their tastes and opinions that they will be
patriotic by inclination, passion, and necessity.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 61
As gender equality was steadily introduced into U.S. Supreme
57. Id. at 204.
58. Id.
59. DAN M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 82 (5th ed. 2000).
60. Olney, supra note 19, at 129.
61. Considerations on the Government of Poland and Its Projected
Reformation, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS
177, 189 (Victor Gourevitch ed., Cambridge University Press 1997) (1771).
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Court equal protection jurisprudence in Washington, the Virginia
Military Institute sat, as it had since 1839, almost 200 miles away
in the small town of Lexington, Virginia. The forward thinking
citizens of Lexington conceived the idea for a state-sponsored
military institute around 1834.62 The Virginia General Assembly
chose their 'gentle town' to host an arsenal left over from the
War of 1812.63 But the constant shenanigans of the Virginia
militiamen selected for the task of guarding the arsenal prompted
concerned Lexingtonians to propose to the General Assembly the
creation of a school, which would use military discipline as its
method, to instill values of education, honor, and public service
among the militiamen. 64 The General Assembly agreed and by
statute created the nation's first state-supported military
educational institution.65
Although it is a military school, VMI is distinct from the
federal military academies. The mission of the federal military
academies, such as West Point and Annapolis, is to train young
people to become professional soldiers; for VMI, its mission is to
produce "citizen-soldiers. ' '6 6  The ideal of the citizen-soldier
originated with the Roman hero Cincinnatus, a farmer who left
his civilian life to defend Rome in a time of invasion, only to
return to his four acres after victoriously defending his
homeland. 67 To educate its pupils toward this ideal, VMI uses
military style training, not as an end, but as a means of instilling
its pupils with the character, honor, and leadership skills
necessary for a productive civilian life, and if the need arises, "to
defend their country in time of national peril. ' '6 8 Lieutenant
General Josiah Bunting III, who served as an expert defense
witness in the trial phases of United States v. Virginia and later
62. STRUM, supra note 3, at 9.
63. HENRY A. WISE, DRAWING OUT THE MAN: THE VMI STORY 9 (1978).
64. STRUM, supra note 3, at 10-11.
65. Id. at 13.
66. See Diane Diamond & Michael Kimmel, "Toxic Virus" or Lady Virtue:
Gender Integration and Assimilation at West Point and VMI, in GOING COED:
WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN FORMERLY MEN'S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 1950-
2000, at 263, 264-65 (Leslie Miller-Bernal & Susan L. Poulson eds., 2004).
67. GARY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 36 (1984).
68. See WISE, supra note 63, at 3; VMI NEW CADET HANDBOOK 2005-2006,
at 7 (2005) [hereinafter CADET HANDBOOK].
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as the Institute's superintendent, testified that the inculcation of
the character of a citizen-soldier in VMI cadets serves the aim of
creating "people who beyond their professional attainments will
feel a larger obligation and responsibility to return something of
what they have been given, to their community. '69 Consequently,
where the federal military academies require mandatory
commissioning in a branch of the military, about 40% of VMI
graduates accept such commissions, and approximately 20-25%
choose the military as a career.70
To imbue a teenager with the character of a citizen-soldier,
VMI employs the "adversative method." The adversative method
consists of several components; however, all components - namely,
egalitarianism, stress, communal living, and a lack of privacy -
work concurrently, creating a "holistic environment."71  The
concert of these components work to isolate a cadet into a closed
egalitarian community, where VMI ethics of character, honor, and
integrity replace contrasting, previously held attitudes and
beliefs. 72 As one columnist described, the adversative method
works to "bur[n] off such divisive, testosterone-induced aspects of
personality as cockiness and sloth and replac[e] them with such
social virtues as honor and loyalty."73
Central to the adversative system is the cadets' living
quarters, or "Barracks." Cadets are required to live in Barracks
for their entire VMI career. 74 Barracks is a spartan structure,
69. Transcript of Record at 988, United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R). A "superintendent" in VMI
terminology is the equivalent of a university president. As a unique military
school, VMI possesses a distinct vocabulary. Rather than a campus, the VMI
property is known as "the Post," the dean is known as "the Commandant,"
students are know as "cadets," vacations are known as "furloughs," and the
cadet dormitory is known as "Barracks." For a more complete list of VMI
vocabulary terms, see CADET HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at 55-62.
70. CADET HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at 8. One such graduate, Colonel
James Hickey, class of '82, recently made his alma mater proud when his
command located a certain former dictator in a hole in the ground near
Tikrit, Iraq. The Irishman Who Got Saddam; It Took the Son of Irish
Immigrants to Finally Nail Saddam Hussein, IRISH VOICE, Dec. 18, 2003,
http://www.irishabroad.com/news/irishinamerica/news/saddam. asp.
71. Transcript of Record at 993, Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (No. 90-
0126-R).
72. STRUM, supra note 3, at 40.
73. John Sedgwick, Guess Whose Coming to VMI?, GQ, July 1997, at 129.
74. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421-22 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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made up of four floors, known as "stoops," each facing inwards to a
courtyard. 75 Within Barracks all components of the adversative
method cohere and reduce new cadets to the "lowest common
denominator. ' 76 Before they matriculate at VMI, new cadets may
be diverse in terms of class, ethnicity, or academic achievement,
but beginning on their first day they are all labeled "rats. '77 The
goal is to create a community of complete egalitarianism. 78 A total
lack of privacy within Barracks also serves this end. This lack of
privacy has caused Barracks to be likened to the Panopticon,
Jeremy Bentham's ideal prison designed to instill a feeling of
constant surveillance among its inmates.79 However, the lack of
privacy inherent in Barracks is not, like the Panopticon, part of a
punitive scheme. The purpose is to instill an ever-present feeling
of belonging to a community beyond one's self.80
Stress, too, bears down on new cadets and creates a sense of
communal suffering. The stress Rats endure is multiform,
whether it be the constant harassment from upperclass cadets,
intense physical exercise, long days and forced marches, or
academics. In his expert testimony, General Bunting explained
that the atmosphere of stress instills in cadets "a certain ability to
function effectively under conditions of stress and demands and
challenges later on in life."''s
Understandably, the New Cadet Handbook is correct in its
assessment that "MI is not for everyone. ' 82 The stress of the
Ratline causes attrition rates to be high, higher than that of the
federal military academies. 83 Those who do survive the Ratline
75. Jeffrey Rosen, Like Race, Like Gender?, THE NEW REPUBLIc, Feb. 19,
1996, at 21.
76. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1423.
77. Id.
78. The extent to which egalitarianism is respected in Barracks was
exemplified by the unusually smooth integration of African-American cadets
in 1968. See WISE, supra note 63, at 287-88.
79. Rosen, supra note 75, at 21.
80. Transcript of Record at 993, Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (No. 90-
0126-R). Traditionally bathrooms were communal, locks on doors
nonexistent, and the glass windows on each room's door were at all times to
be unobstructed.
81. Id. at 992.
82. CADET HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at 11.
83. STRUM, supra note 3, at 48. Historically, four percent of Rats drop
out in the first week and up to twenty-five percent drop out before the first
year is finished. Id.
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graduate with a deep, lasting loyalty to their alma mater. In fact,
the loyalty of alumni has made VMI the recipient of the highest
per capita endowment of any other public university in the
nation. 84
The adversative method does more, however, than produce
loyal alumni. VMI has an impressive history of producing alumni
who achieve a "'disproportionately large number of influential
positions"' in both the civilian and military spheres.8 5 That the
adversative method itself contributes to this success is buttressed
by the fact that VMI is not exceptionally selective in its
admissions.8 6  General Bunting described the adversative
method's success with those that endure it: "There is something
almost chemical in [the adversative method's] attraction for a
certain kind of kid .... He thrives."87
For over a century and a half only men could reap the benefits
of VMI's success. Women, however, were becoming increasingly
involved in traditionally male-dominated professions - the
military is a pertinent example. It appeared to be only a matter of
time before VMI's all-male character would be challenged. But
VMI would not present a case which could fairly be described as a
'clear winne[r]"'18 - the type Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her
colleagues sought out in the past. And it would require, indeed
cause, a reevaluation of what intermediate scrutiny really
entailed.
84. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996).
85. See STRUM, supra note 3, at 89. Notable alumni include a Nobel
Peace Prize winner, Members of Congress, a Pulitzer Prize winner, seven
Medal of Honor recipients, ten Rhodes Scholars, 39 college presidents, 266
generals and flag officers, and a Lesser Saint of the Episcopal Church. See
VMI CATALOGUE 2003-2004, at 5, 6 (2002); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520.
Jonathan M. Daniels, class of '61, was named a Lesser Saint of the Episcopal
Church after his efforts on behalf of African-Americans during the Civil
Rights movement led to his murder by police in Alabama in 1965. 2003
Jonathan Daniels Ceremony, Virginia Military Institute, http://www.vmi.edul
Show.asp?durki=1396&site= 1&return=4892 (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
86. See STRUM, supra note 3, at 33 (noting that VMI admitted seventy-six
percent of its applicants in the late 1980s). For the 2005-2006 academic year,
VMI accepted fifty percent of its applicants. See http:// www.princetonre
view.com/college/research/profiles/admissions.asp?listing=1022822&ltid= l&i
ntbucketid= (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
87. Sedgwick, supra note 73, at 130.
88. Markowitz, supra note 30, at 337.
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B. Intermediate Scrutiny with Three More Words
Ten years before the VMI litigation began, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided a gender discrimination case, Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,89 which would prove directly
controlling in United States v. Virginia.90 But Hogan was also
important for two more reasons. First, it associated three more
words with the intermediate scrutiny test: 'exceedingly
persuasive justification. '' 91 The phrase was born in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, and in that case, as in
Hogan, it was used as a description of state objectives which had
met the important objective/substantial means test.92 In other
words, if the state's justification passed both prongs it was labeled
"'exceedingly persuasive.' 93 As we shall see, the U.S. Supreme
Court would increase its reliance upon these three words to
reformulate the intermediate scrutiny test in United States v.
Virginia.
Secondly, Hogan ended single-sex education at Mississippi
University for Women (MUW) because it held that the state's
justification did not rely upon "reasoned analysis" but the
"application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about
the proper roles of men and women." 94 In other words, the Court's
decision served to terminate outdated stereotypes. United States
v. Virginia would bring this concept one step further.
The Hogan litigation began after an unusual event occurred
in Mississippi: aspirant student Joe Hogan applied to the nursing
89. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (W.D. Va.
1991) ("[Hogan] guides my decision in this case."); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996) ("[Hogan] is immediately in point.").
91. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731.
92. See id. ("[C]onsidering both the asserted interest and the relationship
between the interest and the methods use by the State, we conclude that the
State was fallen far short of establishing [an] 'exceedingly persuasive
justification."'); Pers. Admin'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)
("This Court's recent cases teach that [gender] classifications must bear a
close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives ...
these precedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to
prefer males over females ... would require an exceedingly persuasive
justification.").
93. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731.
94. Id. at 726.
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program at MUW.95 After his inevitable rejection, Hogan brought
suit against the university, won, and MUW appealed. 96 In a 5-4
opinion, authored by the newly confirmed Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision.97 The university could not, the Court held, deny Joe
Hogan admission from MUW, its mission to promote the 'moral
and intellectual advancement of the girls of the state"'
notwithstanding. 9 8
Applying the equal protection intermediate scrutiny test, the
Court held that MUW's discriminatory classification must serve
'"important governmental objectives.' and the '''discriminatory
means employed"' must be 'substantially related to the
achievement"' of its objective. 99 Under intermediate scrutiny, a
state's justification is insufficient if it is based on "archaic and
stereotypic notions" concerning the roles of men and women.1 00
Mississippi offered an affirmative action justification, arguing that
MUW's single-sex policy compensated women for other
discriminatory barriers. 10 1 However, in a nation where 94% of
nursing degrees were awarded to women, the Court held that the
state's actual justification was not to compensate women, but to
exclude men, using a "stereotyped view" of nursing as a "woman's
job .102
The Court also held that MUW's policy failed the second
prong of the intermediate scrutiny test, that the means employed
to carry out the objective are of a "direct, substantial
relationship."'103 Because the school allowed male students to
attend some classes as "auditors," the school's claim that women
would be "adversely affected" by men was "fatally
undermine[d]." 10 4 The state's justification failed both prongs, thus
95. Hogan v. Miss. Univ. for Women, 646 F.2d 1116, 1117 (5th Cir. 1981).
96. Id.
97. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733.
98. Id. at 720 n.1 (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 37-117-3 (1972)).
99. Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 150 (1980)).
100. Id. at 725.
101. Id. at 727.
102. Id. at 729, 729 n.14.
103. Id. at 725.
104. Id. at 730.
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the Court did not consider it 'exceedingly persuasive.."" 105
C. United States v. Virginia Begins
In 1989, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division
received word of a young woman who applied to VMI, but was
denied admission based on her sex.106 The United States brought
suit against VMI and Virginia in her behalf, pursuant to Title IV
of the Civil Rights Act.1 07 Like Joe Hogan, the Government would
argue that VMI could not constitutionally refuse to admit persons
of a particular gender under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hogan may have been controlling throughout United States v.
Virginia, but Virginia and VMI's justification were distinct from
MUW's. The interest that Virginia provided to meet the
"important governmental objective" prong of the intermediate
scrutiny test was not affirmative action, but educational
diversity. 108  Virginia funded fifteen institutions of higher
learning, each different from the other, whether it be in terms of
size, location, or stated mission. 109 The service that this diversity
provided was a choice to attend the university that best fulfilled
an individual's interest. 110 Virginia considered VMI a vehicle for
this diversity because it provided the state's only all-male military
institute based on the adversative method.
Experts on both sides agreed that single-sex education
provided unique benefits to its students."1 Virginia argued that
those who decided upon the type of education that VMI offered
105. Id. at 731.
106. STRUM, supra note 3, at 86. The identity of this woman remains
undisclosed. Id.
107. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (2006) (permitting the United States itself to
bring actions alleging discrimination by educational institutions that
contravene the U.S. Constitution or federal statute when the aggrieved party
is unable to "initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings").
108. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412.
109. Id. at 1418-19.
110. Transcript of Record at 984, Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (No. 90-
0126-R).
111. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412. See also United States v. Virginia,
976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that single-sex education provides
students with "advantages over coeducational colleges in numerous areas"
and that "single-sex education also has been found to have salutary
consequences for sexual equality in the job market.").
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should have the choice to attend such an institution. 112 Yet, no
state-supported single-sex education for women existed in
Virginia. 113 Those that were founded as such had, by their own
volition, chosen to become coeducational. 114  To ensure that
Virginia's daughters could still reap the benefits of single-sex
education, the state distributed scholarship funds to students who
chose to attend one of the state's four private all-female
colleges. 115
The problem remained, however, that women in Virginia
could not experience the adversative method if they so desired.
They could receive military training in the Corps of Cadets at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, but that was not an adversative
program."l 6 Female demand for the adversative method remained
too low to create a separate, all-female adversative military
academy; 117 and VMI argued that the introduction of women into
the Institute, as the Government had demanded, would destroy
the very nature, and therefore greatness, of the Institute. Unlike
MUW, VMI advanced that its system was unique and required
homogeneity of gender; MUW possessed no unique qualities other
than its single-sex status.
112. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1420.
113. Id. at 1418-19.
114. Id. The Commonwealth of Virginia grants the Boards of Visitors of its
various universities autonomy in such decisions as "mission, curriculum, the
composition of its faculty, and the composition of its student body." Id. at
1419.
115. Id. at 1420. As pointed out at oral argument before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the total monies allotted for such scholarships were less than the total
monies allotted to VMI. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
116. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1430-32.
117. See id. at 1436. Although the District Court's factual findings
admitted that there was "a great deal of speculation, but very little evidence"
on the demand for an adversative program among women, the findings also
note that VMI had received, between 1988 and 1990, 347 requests for
information from women. Id. Because the number of inquiries to a
university over a two-year period is quite larger than the number of
prospective students who will actually apply, become accepted, and decide to
enroll, it seems safe to say that female demand in adversative training was,
at the time of litigation, quite low. The fact that only fifty-one female cadets
enrolled at VMI in the 2005-2006 academic year is further proof that demand
among females for adversative training is minimal and would not warrant a
separate facility. See Board of Visitors Meeting at 2 (Aug. 25 & 27, 2005),
http://www.vmi.edu/medialbov/BOV%202005%20August%20Minutes.pdf.
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It was this threat to the school's culture that sparked intense
passion among VMI's defenders. General Bunting likened VMI's
feelings on this point to a First Century adage: "Men bent on
change, in the expectation that change will improve their lot, find
often that their expectation was not gratified, and that they lost
what they had."118 VMI's supporters took this cautious approach,
and were unwavering in their struggle to preserve what they had.
Expert defense witness Dr. David Riesman, a Harvard sociologist,
praised VMI's institutional character as 'the strongest assault"'
on the 'rating, dating, mating, youth culture."' 119 Dr. Riesman,
like all of VMI's witnesses, believed that change at the Institute
would fatally undermine its avowed purpose. 12 0 Although Dr.
Riesman's testimony is not provided in the trial transcript because
his testimony was given by de bene esse deposition, fellow expert
witness General Bunting paraphrased his position on VMI's
culture:
[Clolleges that most decisively intervene in the lives of
their students are those of an unusual, distinctive culture
and ethos: singular places with long-serving teachers
(many of whom are "characters"), cherished and ancient
eccentricities, and adamant allegiance to the work of
forming "character" as well as educating mind. [VMI]
qualified as such a singular place; that singularity should
not.., be put at risk. 12 1
If VMI admitted women, they argued, the Institute could not
maintain key elements of Barracks life such as total absence of
privacy, egalitarianism, and the strenuous physical standards. 122
If VMI lost its "distinctive culture" and "ethos" it would be
incapable of providing educational diversity. 123 VMI would have
118. Interview with Lieutenant General Josiah Bunting III,
Superintendent Emeritus, Virginia Military Institute, in Newport, R.I. (Feb.
4, 2006).
119. STRUM, supra note 3, at 163.
120. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1435-36.
121. JOSIAH BUNTING III, SINGULAR EMINENCE: A LIFE OF GEORGE CATLETT
MARSHALL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 47, on file with author).
122. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412, 1435. As for physical standards, the
federal military academies have developed a program which assigns men and
women different physical requirements in an effort to take into account
"physiological differences." See Diamond & Kimmel, supra note 66, at 268.
123. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1426.
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to abandon its adversative method, as the federal military
academies had done, ceasing that in which some women had
desired to participate. 124 If the system remained in place, VMI
ran the risk of creating an isolated minority within Barracks,
which Bunting described as a "brutal disservice to young
women."
1 25
Judge Jackson Kiser, presiding over the trial, accepted
Virginia's argument that educational diversity was an "important
state educational objective" for VMI's single-sex admissions policy
and that the justification was substantially related to that
objective because only through this all-male adversative
environment could that diversity be achieved. 126 "VMI," he wrote,
"truly marches to the beat of a different drummer, and I will
permit it to continue to do so."1 2 7
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that VMI may
march to its own beat, provided the state of Virginia offered some
concessions. 128  VMI's mission, the court held, could only be
achieved in a single-sex environment.1 29 To the court, it was "not
the maleness, as distinguished from femaleness, that provide[d]
justification for the program" it was the "homogeneity of gender in
the process" that led to the program's success. 130  Gender
integration, therefore, would destroy VMI's ability to carry out its
mission, dismantling that which young women sought to gain; or,
as the court described it, a "Catch-22."'131  But the fact still
remained that Virginia only offered this program to one gender.
Thus, the court held VMI could remain single-sex only if
"alternatives [were] available"; namely, privatization or the
creation of "parallel programs."132
124. Id. at 1412. The abandonment of the adversative model in the
federal military academies was done largely in response to the creation of an
all-volunteer military, for fears that adversative training would encourage
cadets to quit. See STRUM, supra note 3, at 141.
125. Transcript of Record at 1000, Virginia 766 F. Supp. 1407 (No. 90-
0126-R).
126. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 897.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 900.
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VMI and Virginia chose the latter. They looked to the private,
all-female Mary Baldwin College (MBC), thirty-five miles to the
north, as a partner. The new program was named the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) and its mission was to
produce citizen-soldiers, but in a manner that would both suit and
attract a sufficient number of female enrollees. 133 The Virginia
General Assembly and the VMI Foundation would provide funding
on an equal, per capita basis. 134 Additionally, VMI would open its
network of alumni to VWIL graduates. 135
VWIL was to be planned and implemented largely by the
faculty at MBC, drawing upon experts on the 'developmental
psychology of women and the cognitive development of women.""' 136
These experts in women's education created a program that was
not based on the adversative model because they determined that
such a program was "inappropriate" and "counter-productive" for
women. 137 Instead, these experts created a system that instilled
leadership and character through cooperation and the
reinforcement of self-esteem.138 Although the experts agreed that
some women could succeed in an adversative environment, market
forces, determined by demand and finite state resources,
mandated that an all-female version of VMI was imprudent.
Significant differences, however, existed between VWIL and
VMI, and the Government seized upon these differences as
evidence that gender discrimination in Virginia higher education
could end only when VMI permitted females in the Ratline. Most
obviously was that VWIL was not an adversative program. 139
VWIL cadets would live in conventional dormitories, not in
Barracks - a lifestyle vital for proper adversative training. 140
Uniforms were not required on a daily basis and the military
133. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476, 479 (W.D. Va. 1994).
134. Jeremy N. Jungreis, Comment, Holding the Line at VMI and the
Citadel: The Preservation of a State's Right to Offer a Single-Gender Military
Education, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 795, 818 (1996).
135. Id.
136. Id.; STRUM, supra note 3, at 203. Mary Baldwin College
enthusiastically accepted this opportunity and viewed it as a remedy to
declining enrollment. See STRUM, supra note 3, at 201.
137. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 497, 502.
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component of VWIL took the form of ROTC, rather than the
twenty-four hour a day military regimen of VMI.14 1 Also, students
entering MBC had an average SAT score of 100 points lower than
those at VMI. 142 Compared to VMI, MBC's endowment was
substantially lower and its facilities, particularly athletic
facilities, were less extensive. 143 Moreover, differences existed
academically: MBC was a liberal arts college with no engineering
program; the engineering program at VMI was time-honored and
reputable. 144
In the second, remedial phase of the litigation, the District
Court approved VWIL as a sufficient remedy. The District Court
found that the differences in methodology between the two
programs was pedagogically justified based on the findings of the
experts; the differences in academic offerings and facilities were
excused because in an educational system which strives for
diverse offerings, an identical curriculum at each university is
neither the goal nor a financial possibility. 145 "If VMI marches to
the beat of a drum," Judge Kiser wrote, "then Mary Baldwin
marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both
will have arrived at the same destination."' 46
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that although there
were differences in the programs, the notion that "a comparable
opportunity requires an identical program is not sustained by the
Equal Protection Clause."'147  The two programs must be
"sufficiently comparable," and to the court, they were. 148 The
Government appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 149
141. Id. at 498, 495.
142. Id. at 501.
143. Id. at 503.
144. See id. VMI was the first Southern school with an engineering
program. See WISE, supra note 63, at 13.
145. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476, 480-83.
146. Id. at 484.
147. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1240 (4th Cir. 1995).
148. Id. at 1241.
149. United States v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995).
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IV. A STANDARD IS RAISED
[T]he problem which confronts the judge is in reality a twofold one:
he must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle,
the ratio decidendi; he must then determine the path or direction
along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is not to
wither and die.
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo 150
A. "Skeptical Scrutiny"
Through the pen of Justice Ginsburg, the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down United States v. Virginia on June 26, 1996 with a
judgment favoring the Government. 151 To VMI supporters it was
a 'savage disappointment"'; interestingly, some women's
advocates felt the same. 152 In a 7-1 opinion, the Court did not
concede to either group something it wanted: an all-male VMI on
the one hand, or an explicit grant of strict scrutiny for gender-
based equal protection claims on the other. 153  Upon closer
examination, however, the Court applied the intermediate
scrutiny test in a manner much more rigorous than that of
precedent. The analysis used was labeled "skeptical scrutiny"'1
54
and its application to the facts of United States v. Virginia would
prove it to be more closely related to strict scrutiny than to
conventional intermediate scrutiny.
To be sure, the Court made clear that gender was not to be
150. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28 (1921).
151. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
152. Compare Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Invalidates Exclusion of
Women by VMI, WASH. POST, June 27, 1996, at Al (quoting Superintendent
Bunting, who described the ruling as "a savage disappointment for the
alumni"), with Shayne R. Kohler, Note, Dismantling a Relic of the Nineteenth
Century: An End to Discrimination at the Virginia Military Institute, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 717, 750 (1996) ("The Supreme Court should have declared that
strict scrutiny applies to all classifications based on gender."), and Ellington
et al., supra note 46, at 700 ("Women's rights groups from all camps hoped
[Justice Ginsburg] would continue to argue for strict scrutiny in gender
discrimination cases once she was appointed as an Associate Justice to the
United States Supreme Court.").
153. The case involved only eight Justices because Justice Thomas recused
himself; his son was enrolled at VMI. See STRUM, supra note 3, at 246.
154. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
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equated with race as a suspect class.15 5  In fact, the Court
observed that 'inherent differences' between men and women...
remain cause for celebration."'' 5 6 Distinctions can be made along
gender lines provided that they do not "perpetuate the legal, social
and economic inferiority of women."15 7
At the outset, the Court's definition of the "skeptical scrutiny"
test appeared very similar to the previous formulation of
intermediate scrutiny: "the reviewing court must determine
whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive' ...
[t]he State must show 'at least that the [challenged] classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."' 5 8  But it was the Court's
frequent application of the phrase "'exceedingly persuasive
justification"' that served most to shift the standard to a higher
level s15 9 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence, the
phrase 'exceedingly persuasive"' was originally intended as an
"observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test."160 It
was not, he argued, "a formulation of the test itself."16 1 Indeed,
the phrase was used in Hogan according to Rehnquist's analysis.
There, the Court first determined whether the state's objective in
maintaining an all-female nursing school was "important" and its
means "substantially related" to the end; because the
classification failed both prongs it could not be described as
"'exceedingly persuasive."'1 62
By contrast, the Virginia Court used the 'exceedingly
persuasive justification"' language as the starting point of its
analysis. The Court held that such a justification is "the solid
base," indeed the "core instruction," required for all gender-based
classifications. 163 The test as applied in Virginia requires the
state to meet the "demanding" burden of 'exceedingly
persua[ding]"' the Court that its classification is valid; and if so,
155. Id. at 532-33.
156. Id. at 533.
157. Id. at 534.
158. Id. at 533 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 524, 530, 531, 534, 556 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
160. Id. at 559.
161. Id.
162. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9, 731 (1982).
163. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 546.
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then the classification's end is sufficiently "important" and its
means "substantially related" to the end. 16 4 In other words, a
classification must be "exceedingly persuasive" before it can be
"important." The difference is subtle but connotes a more
demanding test. A demonstration of how it was applied in the
context of United States v. Virginia will illustrate.
First, however, the Court did not rely on this new formulation
in reviewing Virginia's assertion that VMI's admissions policy
served the "important governmental interest" of educational
diversity. The Court did not dispute the experts that single-sex
education possessed pedagogical benefits and that educational
diversity itself was a public benefit. 165 But, to the Court, all of the
expert testimony on this issue was irrelevant. Diversity in
education was not, it held, the true justification for VMI's
admission's policy. 166  Instead, it was "invented post hoc in
response to litigation."'6 7
To determine the nature of Virginia's proffered justification,
the Court looked to that state's history of higher education. It
found a pattern of gender discrimination in the form of
"protection" - both for the sake of women against higher
education, and for higher education against women. 168 When
Virginia did create universities exclusively for women they lacked
the "resources and stature" of male schools, and all had later
become coeducational.169 And the Court found only one mention of
diversity officially pronounced by the state - in a 1990 report,
which also mentioned that state universities must 'deal with...
students without regard to sex, race, or ethnic origin."' 170
Thus, no matter how beneficial the experts may have agreed
VMI's admission policy was toward the interest of educational
diversity, the Court found "no persuasive evidence" that diversity
164. Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 535.
166. Id. at 536-37.
167. Id. at 533.
168. Id. at 536-38 (noting that at the time of VMI's founding "[h]igher
education was ... considered dangerous for women" and, later, that the
admission of women at the University of Virginia would damage the school's
stature).
169. Id. at 538.
170. Id. at 538-39.
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was the state's true purpose. . 71 Rather, to the Court, without an
official state pronouncement of diversity, VMI's policy was a relic
of earlier exclusionary policies that historically prevailed in the
state, regardless of whether it actually happened to create
diversity in the state's educational scheme.
The Court's emphasis on the "exceedingly persuasive"
language is most pronounced in its review of VMI's assertion that
the adversative method would not exist - for men or women - in a
coeducational system. To the Court, the testimony of VMI's
experts was akin to predictions made concerning other systems -
such as law schools, medical schools, police forces, and the
military - that gender integration would downgrade their
stature. 172 However, the Court noted that gender integration had
succeeded in these systems and that assertions to the contrary
only "imped[ed] women's progress toward full citizenship
stature."173 In the Court's estimation, gender integration at VMI
would "require accommodations," but based on the experience of
these other, different institutions, the adjustments would be
"manageable."'174 Thus, neither VMI's experts, nor the findings of
the lower courts could "exceedingly persua[de]" the Court that
change at VMI would bring a result more disastrous to the
adversative system than what occurred at the service academies
or other traditionally all male universities.
Inherent in VMI's argument that the system would be altered
unrecognizably in the face of coeducation was that most women
would either not want, or be unable to withstand, the adversative
system. 175 Consequently, VMI argued that altering a system for a
permanent, tiny minority was not required of the "substantial
relationship" prong of the intermediate scrutiny test. 176 However,
because experts on both sides stipulated that "some women" could
survive in, and would desire, an adversative education, the Court
held that VMI could not categorically exclude all women. 177
This holding makes clear that the Court's standard of
171. Id. at 539.
172. Id. at 543-45.
173. Id. at 542 n.12.
174. Id. at 540, 550-51 n.19.
175. Id. at 541.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 546.
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"skeptical scrutiny" was concerned, as Justice Ginsburg was in her
career as a litigator, with the individual. This is where the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" language heightens the
standard. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, the standard as
applied to VMI was much closer to the narrowly tailored
requirement of a strict scrutiny means analysis. 178 Traditional
intermediate scrutiny required only a "substantial relation"
between the means and end of a classification, but the Court
employed to the present case a "least-restrictive-means
analysis."' 79 Justice Scalia pointed to precedent where gender
classifications were upheld, classifications which did not consider
whether the distinction was true in "every instance," but whether
by and large the classification substantially related to the
government's objective. 180
Furthermore, where such precedent as Hogan looked to
whether gender classifications reflected "stereotypic notions,"'18
the Virginia Court added that a classification must also not be a
"generalizatio[n] about 'the way women are."' 182  As one
commentator noted, the word "stereotypes" appeared only once in
the Court's opinion, and only in quoting Virginia's brief that VMI's
admission policy did not comprise such notions. 183 Throughout
the litigation, VMI had argued that it had met the "reasoned
analysis" requirement demanded by Hogan and by presenting
expert testimony on the 'important differences between men and
women in learning and developmental needs." ' 18 4 The Virginia
Court, however, never mentioned any requirement of "reasoned
analysis." Yet, the Court did not seem to dispute that there may
be differences, on average, in the learning needs of men and
women. But again the Court concerned itself with the individual.
Because VMI's admissions policy was based on generalizations
178. See id. at 573.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 573-74 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)).
181. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
182. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
183. Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 843 (2002).
184. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549 (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 28, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)).
A DECADE LATER
about "most women," at the expense of "some women,"
stereotypical or not, the generalization was deemed
unconstitutional. 185
Additionally, the Court held that VMI "trained their
argument on 'means' rather than 'end,' and thus misperceived [the
Court's] precedent." 186  Where VMI regarded its single-sex
adversative system as its objective, the Court viewed the
production of citizen-soldiers as the objective, an objective "great
enough to accommodate women." 18 7 A difficult standard to meet
indeed, as the dissent noted, because an argument could always be
made that any state objective is 'great enough to accommodate
women."' 188
Clearly, under "skeptical scrutiny" the relationship between
the state's end and the means employed is much narrower than
the traditional requirement of a "substantial relationship." If
"some women" could participate, and a court determined change to
the existing system was "manageable," the categorical exclusion of
these individuals was violative of equal protection. The
appropriate remedy, therefore, must concern itself with these
individuals and put them in 'the position they would have
occupied in the absence of [discrimination]."' 89  Under this
standard, VWIL had no chance of survival as an adequate remedy.
The inherent differences in VWIL's methodology, the Court held,
may be pedagogically justified based on the learning needs of
''most women," but "some women" - those willing and able to
attend VMI - would not, at VWIL, find themselves in 'the
position they would have occupied"' at VMI.190 Professional
educators created VWIL as a means of achieving the goal of
citizen-soldier in a way deemed appropriate for the majority of
women. But such studies were, to the Court, "generalizations
about . . . what is appropriate for most women" and such "no
longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
185. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
186. Id. at 545.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 587 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
189. Id. at 547 (alteration in original) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
190. Id. at 555-56.
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capacity place them outside the average description."'19'
Moreover, the Court was particularly concerned with the
intangible aspects of a university. A university's intangible
qualities are 'incapable of objective measurement" and include
"'position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community,
traditions and prestige." 92  To the Court, VWIL may be a
valuable experience for some, but it simply did not have the
intangible qualities of a VMI degree.193
The Court's decision left VMI with only two options:
privatization or integration. No further remedy was possible in
light of the Court's emphasis on the individual and an institution's
intangible qualities. VMI's prestige and singularity made it
impossible to replicate. A "blunt remedy" was applied, and in one
way or another, a new era was to begin at VMI.194
A new era began in gender-based equal protection law as well.
Many believed "skeptical scrutiny" was a clear break from past
intermediate scrutiny analyses; and, in fact, it was. 195  The
decision was a continuation of Justice Ginsburg's push towards
establishing gender as a suspect class which began twenty-five
years earlier in Reed v. Reed. In 1996, United States v. Virginia
appeared nearly as important as Reed. Where Reed moved the
standard for gender classifications to a heightened form of
rational basis, and thus paved the way for intermediate scrutiny
in Craig v. Boren; United States v. Virginia represented a move
from traditional intermediate scrutiny to "skeptical scrutiny,"
opening the door to the possibility of strict scrutiny in the next
round of U.S. Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence. As
we shall see, this did not become the case.
A question remains and should be answered: Why did Justice
Ginsburg, in light of her career as a litigator, settle for "skeptical
scrutiny" rather than author an opinion establishing strict
scrutiny for gender classifications? After all, the judgment would
have been the same; those who did not support her call for strict
scrutiny could easily have joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's
191. Id. at 550 (emphasis in original).
192. Id. at 554 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
193. Id. at 555.
194. For a discussion on the implementation of the Court's decision at
VMI, see Interlude, infra.
195. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 4, at 35; Gleason, supra note 4, at 809.
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concurrence or written their own. Separate aspects of Justice
Ginsburg's philosophy as a jurist provide a likely explanation of
her restraint against strict scrutiny. First, Justice Ginsburg
possesses a strong belief in collegiality among the Court. 196 To
her, a Court fractured by concurrences and dissents threatens the
'[r]ule of law virtues of consistency, predictability, clarity, and
stability."' 197 Second, Justice Ginsburg has a reputation as a
restrained jurist, one who dutifully adheres to precedent.' 9 8 A
sharp turn towards strict scrutiny would have undone two decades
of intermediate scrutiny precedent.
Yet, Justice Ginsburg did increase the rigor of the
intermediate scrutiny test. An explanation lies in the fact that
Justice Ginsburg is still the same person who, in the 1970s, and
from the opposite side of the bench, successfully prodded the U.S.
Supreme Court, case-by-case, to review gender classifications at
the mid-point between rational basis and strict scrutiny.
"[S]keptical scrutiny" provided the key: through it Justice
Ginsburg remained consistent with her philosophies as a jurist
and as a former advocate. Exercising her characteristic and
"terse, carefully worded way,"'199 she was able to enlist a majority
of the Court to further raise the intermediate scrutiny standard.
Interestingly, a footnote in United States v. Virginia provides a
clue that Ginsburg's work towards strict scrutiny is not finished.
She wrote: "The Court has thus far reserved most stringent
judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race" and, by
implication, not gender. 200 "[T]hus far" the Court has refused, she
seems to say, but a new day will come.
B. The Lower Courts Juggle "Skeptical Scrutiny"
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented that the
Court's use of the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification"'
196. See Rebecca L. Barhnhart & Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of
Judicial Philosophy: The Impact of the Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender
Discrimination Principles on Her Separate Opinions Involving Gender
Discrimination, 7 N.Y. Ciry L. REV. 275, 276 (2004).
197. See id. (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1992)).
198. See Rosen, supra note 32, at 65.
199. Id.
200. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 n.6 (emphasis added).
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would "introduc[e] an element of uncertainty" to lower court
application of the intermediate scrutiny test. 20 1 He was right.
Within the context United States v. Virginia the limits of
intermediate scrutiny were expanded further than ever before,
but, as a whole, the lower federal courts were inconsistent in their
application of the standard. 202
For instance, several circuit courts in the first few years
following United States v. Virginia refused to either acknowledge
or apply any form of intermediate scrutiny beyond the pre-
Virginia standard. A divided First Circuit, in Cohen v. Brown
University, determined that "Virginia adds nothing to the
analysis" of gender classifications, and that the Virginia Court
applied traditional intermediate scrutiny regardless of its "liberal
use of the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' 203 In a
sexual harassment case, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
Virginia Court's language may have heightened the level of
scrutiny for gender classifications but expressed "no opinion" on
whether that was so. 20 4 Instead, the court applied the traditional
test, citing Hogan.205
By contrast, many lower courts interpreted United States v.
Virginia to require a heightened form of scrutiny. For example,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Buzzetti v. City of New
York, relied exclusively on the 'exceedingly persuasive
justification"' language from Virginia.206 However, the challenge
in that case was against an ordinance that placed different
restrictions on strip clubs that feature male and female dancers. 207
Therefore, the court held that the city had provided an
"'exceedingly persuasive justification"' because the ordinance was
based on "clear sexual differences. '208 Additionally, the Third
201. Id. at 559.
202. For a thorough survey of lower court decisions in this area from 1996-
2001, see Olney, supra note 19, at 149-65.
203. 101 F.3d 155, 183 n.22 (1st Cir. 1996). In a dissent, Judge Torruella
argued that "the Supreme Court appears to have elevated the test applicable
to sex discrimination cases to require an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification.' This is evident from the language of both the majority opinion
and the dissent in Virginia." Id. at 191.
204. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996).
205. Id. at 455-56.
206. 140 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1998).
207. Id. at 137.
208. Id. at 141, 144.
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Circuit Court of Appeals, in Breyer v. Meissner, began its equal
protection analysis of a federal immigration statute with heavy
reliance on the Virginia Court's instruction that an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification"' was required by the Government; and, in
the absence of one, the statute was rendered unconstitutional. 2 09
INTERLUDE: "IN A SPIRIT OF ADDING ON"
A short digression may be in order if the reader is interested
in how VMI implemented United States v. Virginia; if not, the
legal analysis continues below. 2 10 After VMI's legal defeat, many
alumni considered privatizing the school to escape the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, privatization posed serious
problems, primarily financial, but also concerning the public's
view of VMI. Known as an institution that turned rowdy young
men into a "crowd of honorable youths, '2 11 privatization would
make VMI a symbol of opposition to civil rights, and in the words
of then-Virginia Governor George Allen, VMI would "be made by
the media into a pariah. '2 12
More compelling, however, was that the Department of
Defense had indicated it may not grant VMI graduates
commissions if the school privatized rather than integrated. 2 13
Former VMI Superintendent, General Bunting, explained how
devastating such a decision would be: "For men who have
successfully completed a VMI cadetship, not to be able to be
commissioned would be the equivalent of Jesuit novitiates, having
successfully fulfilled all the searching and stringent requirements
of ten years in the seminary, being denied ordination."2 14 The
VMI Board of Visitors avoided all these negative possibilities by a
9-8 vote in favor of integration. 215
When the VMI Board of Visitors made the decision, VMI's
209. Id. at 425-26.
210. For a complete account of the changes made at VMI after the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision, see generally BRODIE, supra note 3.
211. See generally A CROWD OF HONORABLE YOUTHS: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON
THE FIRST 150 YEARS OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE (Thomas W. Davis
ed., 1988).
212. Alumni Present Case for Making VMI Private, AKRON BEACON J.,
Sept. 21, 1996, § Nation, at A4.
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administration vowed to implement the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision nobly.2 16  It would not, however, radically alter its
method, and it chose the word "assimilation" rather than
"integration" to describe the introduction of women.217 The school
began a "year long conversation" with itself to determine how best
to assimilate female cadets.218 Change, however, would be done
"in a spirit of adding on,"219 a manner which would retain the
traditional aspects of VMI's culture, altering only what was
practically necessary to welcome female cadets.220
Today, VMI has been coeducational for nearly ten years. The
school remains impressively high on college ranking lists, 22 1 and
enrollment also remains high.222 According to such indicators,
VMI seems as if it indeed succeeded as a coeducational system.
Perhaps, however, it may be too soon to definitively answer that
question. A wiser response may be found in the trial transcript,
voiced by General Bunting, as an expert witness:
Education as a topic is a rather unsatisfying one for
people that wish to attain demonstrable conclusions. We
cannot in fact measure how successful most academic
institutions are unless we look at the careers of the
graduates after they left.... [U]nless we have some sense
of what those students do in the 60 or 70 years of life they
have left, we can't make really useful judgments about
how good their educational experience, and by
implication, how good their college has been. 22 3
Interestingly, an indication that the U.S. Supreme Court
would begin rethinking the "skeptical scrutiny" standard which
mandated VMI's coeducation appeared only the next year after
coeducation began.
216. BRODIE, supra note 3, at 11.
217. Id. at 74.
218. Id. at 185.
219. Transcript of Record at 1003, United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R).
220. BRODIE, supra note 3, at 43.
221. See http://www.vmi.edu/show.asp?durki=6607 (last visited March 20,
2006).
222. See http://www.princetonreview.com/college/research/profiles/general
infomore.asp?listing=1022822&ltid=l (last visited March 20, 2006).
223. Transcript of Record at 1013, Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (No. 90-
0126-R).
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V. THE DEMISE OF "SKEPTICAL SCRUTINY"
A change of mind from time to time is inevitable when
there is a written constitution.
Edward H. Levi 224
A. Miller v. Albright: A Crack in the Balance
Rumblings of the end of "skeptical scrutiny" first appeared at
the U.S. Supreme Court level in Miller v. Albright.225 The case
involved § 1409(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
governs the conferral of citizenship to children born out of
wedlock, outside the United States, and where only one of the
parents is a United States citizen. 226 The statute was challenged
on equal protection grounds because § 1409(a) makes a distinction
along gender lines.2 27 If the citizen parent was the father, the
requirements for the conferral of citizenship upon the child are
more rigorous than if the citizen parent was the mother. 228 Here,
the petitioner was the daughter of a U.S. citizen father, who
224. AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 58 (1949).
225. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
226. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).
227. Miller, 523 U.S. at 424.
228. If the citizen parent is the father, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) requires that the
person seeking citizenship establish:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is
established by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the
time of the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age
of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years -
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's
residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing
under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.
By contrast, if the citizen parent was the mother, §1409(c) requires only the
second requirement, that she had U.S. citizenship at the time of the child's
birth and "had previously been physically present in the United States ... for
a continuous period of one year." 8 U.S.C. §1409(a), (c) (2006).
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invoked third-party standing to assert the rights of her father,
against whom the statute discriminated. 229
A sharply divided Court upheld the statute. Justice Stevens,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote the opinion of the Court.
Their rationale was largely adopted in the context of Nguyen v.
INS, and as that case concerned the same statute, both rationales
will be discussed below. 230  What is important for present
purposes is the standard applied by the respective opinions.
Justice Stevens's opinion provided, for him, an unequivocal shift
from the "skeptical scrutiny" analysis he subscribed to in United
States v. Virginia. His opinion did not label the analysis
"skeptical scrutiny" nor did he employ the phrase 'exceedingly
persuasive justification."' In a footnote, Justice Stevens
mentioned that judicial deference is generally granted to Congress
on issues of immigration and naturalization.231 Such deference is
known as the "plenary power doctrine" whereby the Constitution
grants exclusive authority to the political branches in certain
areas of government. 232 However, Justice Stevens's opinion does
not seem to rely on a strict deference to Congress. Rather, Justice
Stevens held that the statute served both important governmental
interests and that the means employed were substantially related
to that interest.233
Justice Scalia, an opponent of "skeptical scrutiny" in Virginia,
saw no need to revisit the issue here. Joined by Justice Thomas,
their concurrence asserted that applying any tier of equal
protection scrutiny was irrelevant because, they believed,
Congress's "plenary power" over immigration and naturalization
allows for no judicial voice in such matters. 234
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer each filed a dissenting opinion,
and joined each other's, which were both joined by Justice Souter.
Justice Ginsburg asserted that § 1409(a) created a gender
distinction that must be reviewed under "skeptical
examination. ' 235 Her analysis followed that of Virginia, and she
229. Miller, 523 U.S. at 445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. See discussion infra Part V.B.
231. Miller, 523 U.S. at 434-35 n.11.
232. 3A AM. JUR. 2d Aliens and Citizens, § 282 (2006).
233. Miller, 523 U.S. at 442.
234. Id. at 453, 457.
235. Id. at 468.
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held that the Government had not met the burden of establishing
an '"exceedingly persuasive justification.' 236 Justice Breyer's
dissent also followed the standard as set forth in Virginia, which
led to his conclusion the statute should be rendered
unconstitutional. 237
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor cast the deciding votes, which
both upheld § 1409(a) and allowed "skeptical scrutiny" to survive,
at least for another day. Their concurrence argued that the
petitioner could not establish the third-party standing necessary
to assert the rights of her father, against whom the statute
discriminated. 238 Because § 1409(a) does not discriminate on the
basis of the child's gender, the petitioner could not claim, as her
father could have, gender discrimination. 239 Without a petitioner
able to claim gender discrimination, the statute called only for a
rational basis review. 240 It passed the test.24 1 Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, therefore, presented a wildcard. Whether they
would again apply "skeptical scrutiny," as they had in Virginia, or
whether they would fold their hands as had Justice Stevens
remained an open issue until Nguyen v. INS.
B. Nguyen v. INS: Traditional Intermediate Scrutiny Restored
A few weeks after VMI's first coeducational class received
their diplomas, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Nguyen v. INS.242
The case again challenged § 1409(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, but this time there would be no issues of third-
party standing. Here, a U.S. citizen father, together with his alien
child, would stand before the Court and allege gender
discrimination contrary to the equal protection principles of the
U.S. Constitution.243  By a bare majority, the Nguyen Court
upheld § 1409(a), and in doing so abandoned "skeptical scrutiny,"
thereby returning to the traditional intermediate scrutiny
standard.
236. Id. at 469-70.
237. Id. at 482, 488.
238. Id. at 450-51.
239. Id. at 451.
240. Id. at 451-52.
241. Id.
242. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
243. Id. at 57.
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The petitioner in Nguyen challenged § 1409(a) on the grounds
that a citizen mother need establish only a blood relationship with
the citizenship seeking child, regardless of the child's age, 244
whereas the father must also establish one of three other
requirements and before the child reaches eighteen years: 1) that
the child was legitimated under the law of their domicile, 2) that
the father acknowledge his paternity in writing or under oath, or
3) that paternity be established by a court order.245 Here, the
petitioner father established paternity under a court order based
on a DNA sample provided when his son was twenty-eight years
old.246 The Board of Immigration Appeals denied citizenship
because of noncompliance with the restriction that paternity must
be established before the child's eighteenth birthday.247 The lower
federal courts rejected the petitioner's equal protection
challenge. 248
It was two key votes, votes that supported the establishment
of "skeptical scrutiny" in United States v. Virginia, which signaled
the demise of that standard in Nguyen: Justices Kennedy and
Stevens. Justice Stevens's decision to join the majority was
predictable in light of his decision in Miller; therefore, it was
Justice Kennedy, the author of Nguyen, who officially shifted the
balance to the pre-Virginia standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, opponents of "skeptical scrutiny" in Virginia,
unsurprisingly joined the majority. Justice Thomas's position on
application of "skeptical scrutiny" in Virginia cannot be fairly
ascertained because of his recusal from that case. His presence in
the Nguyen majority, therefore, cannot, in itself, be described as a
shift. The remaining proponents of "skeptical scrutiny" filed a
dissent, authored by Justice O'Connor, and joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter.249 They not only advocated striking
§ 1409(a), but analyzed the statute under "skeptical scrutiny. ' 250
For our purposes, the importance of Nguyen is its application
of intermediate scrutiny. Where Justice Ginsburg carefully
244. Id. at 59-60. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006).
245. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
246. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
247. Id. at 57.
248. Id. at 58.
249. Id. at 74.
250. Id. at 91.
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constructed "skeptical scrutiny" through her use of the
'exceedingly persuasive justification"' language, Justice Kennedy
deconstructed it through the elision of this language. Although
Virginia was cited as authority, the Court began its analysis with
the traditional "important governmental objective" and
"substantially related" means test.2 5 1  There was no initial
mention that the Government must first establish an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification."' Nor did the Court label the analysis
"skeptical scrutiny."
The Nguyen Court accepted the Government's assertions that
§ 1409(a) served "important governmental objectives" and that its
means were "substantially related" to its end by finding that the
classification rested on "biological differences."2 52 The Virginia
Court had held that '[p]hysical differences between men and
women . .. are enduring"' and the Nguyen Court held that the
gender distinctions of §1409(a) were based upon such biological
differences. 2 53
An assurance of a "parent-child relationship," the Court held,
was the important governmental interest served by § 1409(a).2 54
To the Court, a distinction along gender lines was acceptable in
this case because "[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated
with regard to proof of biological parenthood. '2 55 Biologically, a
mother must be present at the birth of the child and therefore her
name always appears on the birth certificate. 256 Biology does not
require, however, that the father be present at birth, nor does his
presence prove he is the true father. 2 57 While a DNA test may be
near totally accurate in proving parentage, the Court held that
Congress may have been concerned about the "expense, reliability,
and availability" of such tests throughout the world. 258 Thus, the
Court held, the additional affirmative steps required of citizen
fathers "substantially relate[d]" to the Government's objective
because of the biological requirement that the mother, and only
251. Id. at 60.
252. Id. at 73.
253. Id. at 68.
254. Id. at 62.
255. Id. at 54.
256. Id. at 62.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 63.
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the true mother, be present at birth.259
The Court accepted as a second "important governmental
objective" Congress's interest that there be some proof that the
citizen parent and the child have had some opportunity to develop
"real, everyday ties" with each other - and hence to the United
States - rather than simply proof of biological parentage. 26 0
Affirmative steps toward proving such an opportunity is not
necessary in the case of the mother, the Court held, because the
"initial point of contact" at the child's birth provides this
opportunity. 261 The father, on the other hand, may not be aware
of the child's birth, or even of its conception. 262 The Court cited
the high number of men deployed abroad in the armed forces, as
well as the number of Americans who travel abroad, and was
convinced that many children may be born extraterritorially
without the knowledge of the father, or, even if the father is aware
of the child's birth, he may not ever be present to experience the
opportunity of developing a parental relationship. 263
The petitioners argued - and the dissenters agreed - that
these "important governmental objectives" were the product of a
gender-based stereotype. 26 4 Only a stereotyped view of parental
roles, the dissenters held, explained why Congress would presume
that where a mother and father were both present at birth, they
lacked equal opportunity to develop a relationship with the
child.26 5 The Court considered this a biological reality, rather
than a stereotype. 266 What is important, however, is that the
Court ceased its analysis after its determination that no gender
stereotype existed. Unlike the Virginia Court, which went beyond
an analysis of whether the state's action was based upon
stereotype by further considering whether the statute was an
overbroad generalization, the Nguyen Court never mentioned the
word "generalization" in its opinion. Accordingly, the bar set by
Virginia to all overbroad generalizations had been returned to
whether or not a classification is based upon stereotype.
259. Id. at 64.
260. Id. at 64-65 (citing Miller, U.S. at 438-40).
261. Id. at 65.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 68; Id. at 86-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 86.
266. Id. at 68.
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Under the traditional intermediate scrutiny test, the Court
also found the means employed by § 1409(a), the extra
requirements for citizen fathers, were "substantially related" to
the end of a meaningful parent-child relationship. 267 The father's
potential absence at the child's birth and in its childhood
prompted Congress to require at least proof of an opportunity for a
meaningful relationship. Another alternative may be possible,
and often times the father may have developed a meaningful
relationship with the child that the mother did not. But, the
Court held, a gender-based equal protection analysis does not
require that the classification be "capable of achieving its ultimate
objective in every instance."268  This holding signifies another
sharp break from "skeptical scrutiny." Unlike Virginia, where the
focus was on the individuals who distinguished themselves from
the majority, Nguyen reestablished only a "substantial
relationship., 269
After having determined that § 1409 served an "important
governmental interest" and that its means were "substantially
related" to its objective, the Court then described the
Government's case as 'exceedingly persuasive.' 270 Again, a pre-
Virginia formulation.
Nguyen's dissenters applied "skeptical scrutiny" as they had
in Virginia, and decried the Court's decision as an "aberration" in
gender-based equal protection law.271 To the dissenters, the Court
not only shifted the standard back to traditional intermediate
scrutiny, but in its application, the majority's standard was more
akin to a rational basis review.272 What is clear, however, is a
majority had emerged without an interest in the further
application of "skeptical scrutiny."
Commentators have speculated as to why Justices Stevens
and Kennedy abandoned "skeptical scrutiny." Some have argued
that the plenary power doctrine, though only endorsed in Justices
Scalia and Thomas's short concurrence, was the true impetus
267. Id.
268. Id. at 70.
269. Id. at 68.
270. Id. at 70.
271. Id. at 74-76, 97.
272. Id. at 78-79.
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behind the Nguyen decision.273 But the Court, on two occasions,
held that the plenary power issue need not be addressed because
the statute could be upheld on equal protection grounds. 274 It
seems fitting to take the Court by its word.
Another commentator argued that the Nguyen majority's true
motivation was to "pull in the reins" on "skeptical scrutiny" out of
concern that it would later result in strict scrutiny. 275 Whether
this was the motivation or not, it was, surely, the decision's result.
Perhaps, however cynically, Justices Kennedy and Stevens
subscribed to "skeptical scrutiny" in Virginia because they were
unwilling to provide deference to VMI, and did not believe, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist did, that VMI's admissions policy could be
stricken under traditional intermediate scrutiny. Such a notion
would lend credence to an idea put forth in Justice Thomas's
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.276 There, he viewed the Court's
decision to defer to the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action program to be based on the school being that "of
the elite establishment . . . rather than a less fashionable
Southern military institution. '277
Such speculation, however, may bring us to, as Tennyson
said, "[b]elieving where we cannot prove. '278 For our purposes the
import of Nguyen is that it did, in fact, reestablish a traditional
intermediate scrutiny test after a five-year hiatus. Though the
Nguyen dissenters averred that the decision was more akin to a
rational basis review, the Court's formulation of the test, and thus
its instruction to the lower courts, was that of a pre-Virginia,
traditional intermediate scrutiny test. Therefore, looking back
over the thirty-year history of intermediate scrutiny, it appears
that Nguyen is not the "aberration" that its dissenters asserted it
was; unfortunately or otherwise, United States v. Virginia appears
273. See Jung Kim, Comment, Nguyen v. INS: The Weakening of Equal
Protection in the Face of Plenary Power, 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 43, 43, 54
(2002); Pillard, supra note 183, at 846-47.
274. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61, 72-73.
275. Heather L. Stobaugh, Comment, The Aftermath of United States v.
Virginia: Why Five Justices are Pulling in the Reins on the "Exceedingly
Persuasive Justification" 55 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1775 (2002).
276. 539 U.S. 306, 366 (2003).
277. Id.
278. ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON, In Memoriam A.H.H., in THE WORKS OF
ALFRED LORD TENNYSON 247, 247 (1893).
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to be the true "aberration."
C. Again, a Traditional Formulation
While Nguyen remains the most recent gender-based equal
protection decision since Virginia, the traditional intermediate
scrutiny test was again restated two years later in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.279 The case hinged not
on equal protection itself but upon § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which enables Congress to pass legislation aimed at
enforcing that Amendment.28 0 The case involved the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), passed pursuant to § 5, to protect
persons from gender-based discrimination in the workplace. 28'
Congress cannot, however, define the scope of rights included in
the Fourteenth Amendment - that task resides with the U.S.
Supreme Court.282 To determine if the FMLA was a constitutional
measure under § 5, the Court first determined if, in accordance
with the Court's interpretation of equal protection, Congress had
evidence that there was gender discrimination. 28 3  Congress's
evidence must be consistent with what the Court previously
established such discrimination was, which therefore made the
FMLA necessary.
Chief Justice Rehnquist chose himself to author the opinion 284
and was joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer; all voted to uphold the act on § 5 grounds. 28 5 Therefore, it
was up to Chief Justice Rehnquist to restate the test appropriate
for determining gender discrimination in violation of equal
protection. In doing so, he cited Virginia, but, unsurprisingly, he
omitted the 'exceedingly persuasive justification"' language,
leaving only the important objective/substantial means
279. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
280. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
281. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
282. Id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-24 (1997)).
283. Id. at 729.
284. Columnist Jeffrey Rosen observed that "[t]he chief justice, like each of
his colleagues, has one vote; his greatest power lies in choosing who will write
an opinion when he's in the majority - himself or another justice who he
thinks will best reflect his views." Rehnquist the Great?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Apr. 2005, at 79.
285. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723-24.
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language. 286  He did mention, however, that a gender-based
classification must not rely on "overbroad generalizations" (again
citing Virginia), but his analysis throughout concerned itself only
with "stereotype-based beliefs. ''28 7 By implication, Congress did
not have to consider "skeptical scrutiny" when debating its § 5
power.
Because Hibbs did not need to explore whether the act at
issue was violative of the Equal Protection Clause, but rather of §
5, it will not be controlling over equal protection claims. This
distinction is perhaps why Justices Ginsburg, Souter, O'Connor,
and Breyer did not object to the standard's omission in their
concurrence. 288 However, the case is pertinent because it signifies
another post-Virginia formulation of the traditional intermediate
scrutiny test, irrespective of "skeptical scrutiny."
D. Where We Will Likely Go
Today, both Chief Justice Rehnquist, an opponent of
"skeptical scrutiny," and Justice O'Connor, a proponent of that
standard, are no longer on the bench. The question arises,
therefore, as to whether the delicate 5-4 balance opposed to
"skeptical scrutiny" will shift once again in favor of that standard.
We cannot, of course, be entirely sure. However, considering the
two new members of the Court, the answer is likely no, and,
moreover, the balance will probably shift even further from
"skeptical scrutiny" to a 6-3 majority against.
If Justice Alito remains consistent with Judge Alito, he will
not remain in step with Justice O'Connor on the issue of "skeptical
scrutiny." As a Third Circuit Judge, Alito dissented from two
opinions concerning gender discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, arguing with the majority that it should be more
difficult for plaintiffs to get to trial.28 9 Such opinions imply that
he would be unlikely to favor increasing the intermediate scrutiny
test as applied to gender classifications. Moreover, had Justice
Alito been present on the Nguyen Court, his Third Circuit record
indicates that he would have concurred with Justices Scalia and
286. Id. at 728-29.
287. Id. at 729-34.
288. See id. at 741.
289. See Bray v. Marriott, 110 F.3d 986, 1000 (3d Cir. 1997); Sheridan v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078-79 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Thomas on the issue of plenary power.290
As for Chief Justice John Roberts, he does not possess the
lengthy judicial record of Justice Alito. However, there is a strong
possibility Roberts will remain in accordance with his former
mentor, Chief Justice Rehnquist. If so, the position of the Chiefs
seat against "skeptical scrutiny" will not be disturbed; if not, a 5-4
balance will still exist with Justice Alito.
E. Lower Courts Post-Nguyen
Among the lower federal courts, the additional rigors imposed
by "skeptical scrutiny" on gender-based classifications can still be
found, even after Nguyen. A couple of examples will illustrate.
For instance, the District of Columbia District Court, in AFL-CIO
v. United States, determined that United States v. Virginia stood
for a more searching analysis than traditional intermediate
scrutiny. 29 1  In an explication of the various levels of equal
protection scrutiny, the court cited Nguyen, and restated the
traditional important objective/substantial means test.292
However, it also cited Virginia, labeled the analysis "quasi strict
scrutiny," and determined that gender classifications are no longer
analyzed under "traditional intermediate scrutiny. '293
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Builders
Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, reviewed a race
and gender based affirmative action program. 294  That court
noted, in light of Virginia, that the difference between strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny is "vanishingly small. '295
United States v. Virginia, of course, has not been explicitly
overruled, nor does that possibility seem likely. The lower courts,
therefore, pursuant to the command of the U.S. Supreme Court,
must apply Virginia, as with any other precedent, if it has a
"direct application in a case," regardless if "appears to rest on
290. See Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225, 227-28 (3d. Cir. 2003); Acosta
v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 226-27 (3d. Cir. 2003).
291. 195 F. Supp. 2d 4, 11 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 330 F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
292. AFL-CIO, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
293. Id. at 12.
294. 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001).
295. Id. at 644.
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reasons rejected in some other line of decisions. '296 This way, it is
left to the U.S. Supreme Court "the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions."297 The lower courts, then, must be careful in their
application of Virginia; it must "directly control" to be applicable.
The question over whether a given gender classification will
be "directly" controlled by Virginia may sometimes be difficult.
But to remain in line with the U.S. Supreme Court, the lower
courts must be aware that the Court has not applied "skeptical
scrutiny" since United States v. Virginia, and appears no longer
interested, at least for the foreseeable future, in reviving that
standard.
VI. EPILOGUE
Shortly after United States v. Virginia was decided, Justice
Ginsburg, speaking at the University of Virginia, commented on
the magnitude of that decision: "There is no practical difference
between what has evolved and the [Equal Rights Amendment] ."298
She added, "I would still like it as a symbol to see the E.R.A. in
the Constitution. '299 Today, however, it seems that more recent
U.S. Supreme Court precedent has made an unequivocal shift
back to the traditional standard of intermediate scrutiny,
established thirty years ago, in Craig v. Boren. In essence, VMI's
case was truly landmark, but the standard created within it has
not endured at the U.S. Supreme Court level beyond the context of
that case. Therefore, it seems today that an Equal Rights
Amendment would serve as more than a "symbol." It is likely the
only practical means to establish, as Justice Ginsburg set out to do
over thirty-five years ago, strict scrutiny for gender classifications.
At the moment, the U.S. Supreme Court seems less interested
than it did a decade ago.
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